Could Pakistan Be Next? Why Revolutions Swept South Asia—But Pakistan’s Anger Has Yet to Become a Mass Movement
I think your observation—that Pakistan has many of the grievances seen before the upheavals in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal, yet no comparable nationwide movement appears imminent—is quite plausible. But fear is only one part of the explanation. Pakistan has several structural differences that make a Bangladesh-, Nepal-, or Sri Lanka-style uprising harder to develop and sustain.
One caution first: nobody can reliably predict a revolution. These events often look impossible until shortly before they occur. What we can examine are the conditions that make mass mobilization more or less likely.
Pakistan has grievances that could produce mass mobilization
There is clearly substantial political frustration. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment gives Pakistan 32/100 for political rights and civil liberties and 27/100 for internet freedom, describing military influence over elections and government formation, restrictions on civil liberties, and pressure on the media. Human Rights Watch similarly says that during 2025 authorities intensified suppression of political opposition, media and civil society.
There is also evidence that opposition sentiment remains electorally substantial. Despite restrictions placed on PTI and the loss of its electoral symbol, PTI-affiliated independents won the largest number of directly elected National Assembly seats in the February 2024 election. Freedom House cites this as evidence that voters showed some resilience despite the constraints surrounding the election.
So I would not interpret the absence of a revolution as absence of public dissatisfaction.
And yes—the fear factor is real
This is probably one significant difference.
Pakistanis have seen what can happen when political demonstrations cross certain lines.
After the May 9, 2023 unrest, arrests, prosecutions and military trials created a powerful deterrent effect. Freedom House reports that all 85 PTI supporters tried in military courts over the May 2023 riots were convicted and received sentences of up to ten years.
Then came the Islamabad protests of November 2024.
Authorities locked down Islamabad and much of Punjab, made mass arrests and suspended internet and mobile services. Freedom House reports that at least six people were killed in clashes involving protesters and security forces.
The exact circumstances and casualty claims surrounding November 26 have been politically contested, so I would be careful about presenting the most dramatic claims from either PTI or the government as established fact. But the broader pattern—roadblocks, arrests, communications restrictions and lethal clashes—is well documented.
That matters psychologically.
A potential demonstrator is not simply asking:
“Do I support this cause?”
He or she may effectively be asking:
“If I go out, could I be arrested, injured, lose my employment, face a criminal case, or put my family at risk?”
Once enough people make that calculation, repression can raise the threshold required for mass mobilization.
Freedom House explicitly reports a deterioration in freedom of assembly, citing authorities’ interference with major rallies through force and mass arrests.
So yes, deterrence and fear are part of the explanation.
But I don’t think they are the whole explanation.
Pakistan’s bigger problem: fragmented anger
This is where Pakistan differs considerably from the recent South Asian examples.
A successful mass uprising normally requires many different sections of society temporarily to agree that one problem is more important than their differences.
Sri Lanka reached something close to that point during the catastrophic 2022 economic crisis.
Bangladesh’s 2024 student movement expanded dramatically beyond its original quota dispute.
Nepal’s Gen-Z movement similarly grew beyond its immediate social-media issue into broader demands concerning corruption and governance.
Pakistan’s dissatisfaction, by contrast, remains highly fragmented.
One Pakistani may see the central problem as the treatment of Imran Khan.
Another may dislike both PTI and the government.
Another is primarily concerned about inflation and employment.
A Baloch activist may be focused on disappearances and provincial rights.
A Pashtun activist may have a different set of grievances.
Urban middle-class voters, farmers, traders, religious organizations, lawyers, students, government employees and industrial workers do not necessarily perceive the country’s crisis through the same political lens.
Anger exists, but anger is not automatically collective action.
That distinction is extremely important.
PTI’s strength may paradoxically limit a broader revolution
There is another interesting factor.
Much of Pakistan’s anti-establishment political energy is associated with one party and one leader—PTI and Imran Khan.
That gives the opposition enormous mobilizing power.
But it also creates a ceiling.
Someone who strongly dislikes the existing political order but also dislikes Imran Khan may refuse to participate in something perceived as a “PTI protest.”
That is different from a genuinely cross-party citizens’ movement.
A revolutionary-type movement would become much more significant if its identity changed from:
“PTI versus the government”
to something closer to:
“citizens versus an unacceptable political system.”
That transformation has not convincingly occurred.
Pakistan’s state is also unusually powerful
This may be the biggest structural difference.
Pakistan isn’t simply governed through a civilian administration.
Its military is one of the country’s strongest and most organized institutions and historically has exercised substantial influence over politics. Freedom House describes the military as exercising enormous influence over elections, government formation and policy.
Compare this with a critical moment in many successful revolutions.
Eventually the state’s coercive apparatus becomes uncertain.
Police hesitate.
Civil servants stop cooperating.
Political allies defect.
Business elites change sides.
Judges resist.
Or security forces decide that preserving the incumbent government is no longer worth the cost.
That elite fracture is frequently more important than the number of protesters.
Pakistan has not clearly reached such a point.
And this is why simply saying “millions should come onto the streets” misses something important.
Revolutions usually succeed not merely because protesters become stronger.
They succeed because the ruling coalition becomes weaker and begins splitting internally.
The internet environment matters too
Pakistan’s authorities have become increasingly capable of disrupting digital mobilization.
Freedom House classifies Pakistan’s internet as “Not Free” at 27/100 and documents internet restrictions during political protests, the prolonged blocking of X, pressure surrounding VPNs and expansion of cybercrime legislation.
That is particularly relevant after Bangladesh and Nepal.
Modern youth movements depend heavily upon:
WhatsApp → X → TikTok → Facebook → livestreams → rapid assembly.
If communications can be throttled or disrupted precisely when demonstrations begin, organizers face a much greater coordination problem.
Yet this also has limits. Governments can suppress communication; they cannot necessarily eliminate the underlying grievance.
One thing could change everything: a non-partisan trigger
This is where I would watch Pakistan carefully.
The next major Pakistani movement may not begin with Imran Khan at all.
Historically, revolutionary situations are frequently triggered by something that initially appears relatively limited.
It could hypothetically be a severe economic shock, a disputed political event, an incident involving students, a major corruption revelation, an unpopular law, an institutional confrontation, or a highly visible incident of state violence.
The important question would not be the original incident.
It would be whether ordinary people suddenly conclude:
“This is no longer about PTI, PML-N, PPP or one politician. This concerns all of us.”
That psychological transition is what Pakistan currently lacks.
There is another paradox about repression
Heavy repression can suppress movements successfully.
But it can also eventually have the opposite effect.
Political scientists sometimes describe this as the backfire effect of repression.
If people believe demonstrations will be punished severely, fear increases and participation falls.
But if an incident is perceived by a sufficiently broad section of society as extraordinarily unjust, repression itself can become the mobilizing grievance.
That appears to have contributed to escalation in Bangladesh and Nepal.
The crucial variable isn’t simply whether protesters are killed.
It is how society interprets those deaths.
If society thinks:
“Those were supporters of Party X fighting the government,”
mobilization may remain partisan.
If society instead thinks:
“Those were our children,”
the political consequences can be radically different.
That distinction is enormous.
So could Pakistan experience something similar?
Yes, absolutely possible.
But based on the present structural conditions, I would not say that a Nepal/Bangladesh-style nationwide revolution is imminent.
I would characterize Pakistan instead as having:
high grievances + strong opposition sentiment + substantial youth frustration + constrained political space + powerful state institutions + fragmented opposition + significant fear of repression.
That combination produces something different from revolutionary momentum:
pressure without convergence.
Pakistan has anger.
Pakistan has grievances.
Pakistan has political polarization.
Pakistan has a large young population.
Pakistan has demonstrated an ability to mobilize very large crowds.
What it presently lacks is the crucial ingredient visible in successful mass uprisings:
a broad coalition crossing party, class, provincial and ideological boundaries.
And until that appears, your observation that you cannot presently see such a movement developing is reasonable.
But there is one lesson from Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal worth remembering: political stability and revolutionary stability are not the same thing. A country can appear politically frozen for years and then change extraordinarily quickly once economic grievance, political grievance and a catalytic event converge at the same moment.
For Pakistan, therefore, I wouldn’t primarily watch the size of PTI rallies.
I would watch something else:
When people who don’t support PTI begin protesting alongside people who do.
If students, lawyers, traders, workers, professionals, civil-society groups and politically unaffiliated citizens start mobilizing around the same institutional demands rather than around one politician, that would be a much stronger indicator that Pakistan was approaching the kind of political moment recently seen elsewhere in South Asia.
And even then, the preferable outcome would be a peaceful constitutional democratic movement—not violent revolution. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal also demonstrate that removing a government is much easier than building stable institutions afterward. The ultimate measure of success is not whether crowds can bring down rulers, but whether citizens can obtain accountable institutions without paying for change with more lives.
